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Abstract
With conventional anti-jamming solutions like frequency hopping or spread spectrum, legitimate transceivers
often tend to “escape” or “hide” themselves from jammers. These reactive anti-jamming approaches are constrained
by the lack of timely knowledge of jamming attacks (especially from smart jammers). Bringing together the latest
advances in neural network architectures and ambient backscattering communications, this work allows wireless nodes
to effectively “face” the jammer (instead of escaping) by first learning its jamming strategy, then adapting the rate
or transmitting information right on the jamming signal (i.e., backscattering modulated information on the jamming
signal). Specifically, to deal with unknown jamming attacks (e.g., jamming strategies, jamming power levels, and
jamming capability), existing work often relies on reinforcement learning algorithms, e.g., Q-learning. However, the
Q-learning algorithm is notorious for its slow convergence to the optimal policy, especially when the system state and
action spaces are large. This makes the Q-learning algorithm pragmatically inapplicable. To overcome this problem,
we design a novel deep reinforcement learning algorithm using the recent dueling neural network architecture. Our
proposed algorithm allows the transmitter to effectively learn about the jammer and attain the optimal countermeasures
(e.g., adapt the transmission rate or backscatter or harvest energy or stay idle) thousand times faster than that of the
conventional Q-learning algorithm. Through extensive simulation results, we show that our design (using ambient
backscattering and the deep dueling neural network architecture) can improve the average throughput (under smart and
reactive jamming attacks) by up to 426% and reduce the packet loss by 24%. By augmenting the ambient backscattering
capability on devices and using our algorithm, it is interesting to observe that the (successful) transmission rate
increases with the jamming power. Our proposed solution can find its applications in both civil (e.g., ultra-reliable and
low-latency communications or URLLC) and military scenarios (to combat both inadvertent and deliberate jamming).
Index Terms
Anti-jamming, ambient backscatter, AI-powered rate adaptation, RF energy harvesting, deep dueling, deep neural
networks, deep reinforcement learning, Q-learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to its broadcast nature, wireless communications are particularly vulnerable to jamming attacks,
especially in low-power wireless networks. By injecting interference to the wireless communication channel
(i.e., deliberate jamming), a jammer can degrade the effective signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR),
thereby disrupting or even bringing down legitimate communications links. The jamming attacks can be
easily launched by using commercial off-the-shelf products [1], [2] and have a significant detriment to
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wireless applications, especially for mission-critical systems (e.g., cyber-physical systems in traffic safety,
industry automation or military missions). In practice, jamming signals can also come from inadvertent
sources, e.g., due to device malfunctioning.
A. Related Work and Motivation
Anti-jamming has a very rich literature, originating from the early days of wireless communications.
With most conventional anti-jamming solutions like frequency hopping or spread spectrum, legitimate
transceivers often tend to “escape” or “hide” themselves from jammers. As an example, frequency-hopping
spread spectrum (FHSS) [4]-[11] allows a wireless device to quickly switch its operating frequency to other
frequency channels. As soon as jammer attacks the channel, the device will quickly change its operating
frequency, thereby avoiding the jamming attack. In [4], the authors proposed an integrated bit-level FHSS for
low-power wireless communication systems. The key idea of this approach is exploiting the frequency agility
of bulk acoustic wave resonators. In [5], the authors proposed a hybrid approach using FHSS and direct
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) to cope with fast-following jammers. Using a stochastic game framework,
the authors of [7] studied the strategic interaction between jammers and legitimate users. In particular, the
jammer and the transmitter are considered as two players playing with each other to obtain the optimal attack
and defense strategies, respectively. Through the minimax-Q learning algorithm, the transmitter can gradually
obtain the optimal defense policy, i.e., how to switch between different channels. The simulation results
demonstrated that the proposed framework can maximize the spectrum-efficient throughput. Similarly, a
game theory based anti-jamming framework for frequency hopping wireless communications was considered
in [8]. Nevertheless, these game models require complete information of the jammer, which may not be
available in advance in practice. In [9] and [10], the authors adopt the Q-learning and deep Q-learning
algorithms that allow the transmitter to choose frequencies to hop when the jammer attacks the channel.
In [11], the authors propose a mode-frequency hopping scheme which jointly uses the mode hopping and
the traditional FH for anti-jamming in cognitive radio networks. However, the main limitation of the FHSS
technique is that it requires extra spectrum resources (for hopping to evade the jammers). In addition, with
powerful jammers which can attacks multiple channels simultaneously, FHSS may be less effective.
Besides the FHSS and DSSS techniques, the rate adaptation (RA) technique is also widely adopted, e.g.,
[12]-[14]. The key idea of the RA technique is to proactively or adaptively account for jamming attacks by
operating at a lower transmission rate. In [12], the authors proposed an RA algorithm together with power
control to mitigate jamming. Specifically, the algorithm consists of two modules: (i) a rate module for rate
adaptation and (ii) a power control module for controlling the transmit power at legitimate transmitters. The
experimental results demonstrated that the proposed algorithm can improve the network throughput by 150%
under jamming attacks. However, in [13], the authors revealed that the RA technique is not effective on a
single channel. In [14], the authors investigated the performance of several state-of-the-art RA algorithms
under different scenarios. The experimental results demonstrated that the existing RA algorithms are not
effective to combat smart jamming attacks. Similar to the RA method, legitimate transmitters can also adapt
(i.e., bump/push) their transmit power or beamforming vectors/matrices (to improve the effective SINR) to
overcome or reject the effect of excessive interference. Nevertheless, this solution is either power-inefficient
or not viable for low-power or hardware-constrained devices (e.g., in IoT applications).
In [1], the authors proposed a joint RA and FHSS technique to mitigate attacks from a reactive-sweep
jammer. In particular, the jammer can sweep through a set of channels and sense the activities of legitimate
transmitters to attack. To combat the jammer, the legitimate transmitters can either hop to a new channel
and/or adapt their transmission rates. The authors modeled the system as a zero-sum Markov game and
obtained the optimal policies for the transmitters by solving a constrained Nash equilibrium problem. Similar
to [7], [8], this work also assumed complete information of the jammer in deriving the defense strategy.
Another widely adopted approach in the literature is to use the ultra-wideband communications to hide the
legitimate signals [3] in the noise.
It is worth noting that, to allow the transmitters to effectively escape or hide from the jammer, most
aforementioned solutions require additional resources (in spectrum bandwidth, or transmit power, or hardware
capability). This fact limits the practical applications of these conventional methods, especially for low-power
and/or low-cost communications systems (e.g., in IoT). In this paper, we present a novel anti-jamming
framework for these low-power and/or wireless-power communications devices. Such a framework allows
these wireless transceivers to not only survive jamming attacks without requiring additional resources but
also leverage the jamming signal to improve their transmission rate. To that end, we first observe that most
existing anti-jamming solutions are reactive ones that are constrained by the lack of timely knowledge of
jamming attacks (especially from smart jammers). Bringing together the latest advances in neural network
architectures and ambient backscattering communications, this work allows wireless nodes to effectively
“face” the jammer (instead of escaping) by first learning its jamming strategy, then adapting the rate and
transmitting information right on the jamming signal (i.e., backscattering modulated information on the
jamming signal). In our design, transmitters are augmented with an ambient backscattering communication
circuit [16], [17] and an energy harvester. When a jammer attacks the communication channel, the transmitter
can leverage the jamming signal to backscatter information to the gateway or harvest energy from the
jamming signal.
Our key idea is inspired by the latest advances in ambient backscattering communications (ABC) and RF
energy harvesting. An ABC-capable transceiver can modulate/backscatter the RF ambient signals (e.g., FM,
AM radio signals) to transmit its own information. Interested readers of ABC are referred to [16], [17] and
therein references. Note that ABC, by contrast to bistatic backscattering communications, does not require a
dedicated RF signal source. Specifically, in bistatic backscattering communications, e.g., [19], [41], [42], [43],
backscatter devices transmit information by backscattering the RF signals generated by a dedicated RF
source which is controllable. With the recent development of RF energy harvesting, the transmitter can
harvest energy from RF signals with a high efficiency. In particular, in [33], [34], and [35], the authors
propose novel designs for the rectenna, i.e., rectifier and antenna, and RF-DC converter to improve the
amount of harvested RF energy from RF energy sources. The experimental results demonstrate that with
the proposed rectenna, a tag can harvest RF energy and convert the harvested energy to DC with 70%
efficiency under a wide range of input power. In [36], low power circuit designs for the voltage regulator
and resistor to digital converter are also proposed. Differently, in [37] and [38], the authors aim to maximize
the amount of harvested energy by considering the joint information and energy cooperative problem with
channel constraints.
To deal with the uncertainty (or unknowns) of jamming attacks and ambient RF signals, existing work
often relies on reinforcement learning algorithms, e.g,. Q-learning under the framework of a Markov decision
process (MDP). However, the Q-learning algorithm is notorious for its slow convergence to the optimal
policy, especially when the system state and action spaces are large. This makes the Q-learning algorithm
pragmatically inapplicable. To overcome this problem, we design a novel deep reinforcement learning
algorithm using a new dueling neural network architecture. Our proposed algorithm allows the transmitter to
effectively learn about the jammer and attain the optimal countermeasures (e.g., adapt the transmission rate
or backscatter or harvest energy or stay idle) thousand times faster than that of the conventional Q-learning
algorithm. The transmitters not only successfully defeat jamming attacks, but also leverage jamming signal
to significantly improve the performance for the system. Specifically, extensive simulation results show that
our design (using ambient backscattering and the deep dueling neural network architecture) can improve
the average throughput (under smart and reactive jamming attacks) by up to 426% and reduce the packet
loss by 24%. By augmenting the ambient backscattering capability on devices and using our algorithm, it
is interesting to observe that the (successful) transmission rate increases with the jamming power.
B. Main Contributions
The major contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• We propose a novel smart anti-jamming design using ambient backscatter, energy harvesting, and rate
adaption techniques to defeat smart and reactive jammers. Based on this method, when a jammer attacks
the channel, the transmitter can leverage jamming signal to transmit information using the ambient
backscattering communication technique or harvest energy from the jamming signal. Alternatively, the
transmitter can also choose to adapt the transmission rate to actively1 transmit data.
• To lay a theoretical foundation for our design, we develop a dynamic approach using the MDP
framework and Q- and deep Q-learning algorithms to maximize the average long-term throughput
for systems under the uncertainty of jamming attacks and ambient RF signals. Unlike existing rate
adaption methods that require the explicit or implicit knowledge of the interference/jamming level,
our reinforcement learning-based rate adaptation framework does not require such information. It is
1It refers to the conventional radio transmission that is different from the ambient backscattering transmission.
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also worth emphasizing that such a rate adaptation method is not susceptible/subject to the imperfect
estimation/observations of the jamming signal (e.g., misdetection or false alarms).
• To provide a practical solution for the theoretical Q-learning based approach above, we design a deep
dueling neural network architecture which allows the system to quickly approach to the optimal defend
policy. The key idea of this approach is implementing two streams of fully-connected hidden layers
to separately and concurrently estimate the values of states and advantages of actions. As a result, the
proposed deep dueling algorithm converges thousands times faster than Q-learning based algorithms.
• Finally, we perform extensive simulations with the aims of not only demonstrating the efficiency
of proposed solutions in comparison with other conventional methods, but also providing insightful
analytical results for the implementation of our framework.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II and Section III describe the system model and
the problem formulation, respectively. Section IV presents the Q-learning and deep Q-learning algorithms.
Then, the deep dueling algorithm is presented in Section V. After that, the evaluation results are discussed
in Section VI. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless system considering of a gateway and a transmitter as illustrated in Fig. 1. The
transmitter is equipped with a data buffer to store data before transmitting to the gateway. In addition, we
assume that the transmitter is equipped with an energy harvesting circuit and an energy storage. The energy
harvesting circuit is used to harvest energy from surrounding signals, and then the harvested energy will be
stored in the energy storage for future use. We consider an ambient RF source, e.g., an FM radio tower, that
is located near the system, and thus the transmitter can harvest energy from the RF energy source when the
source is active, i.e., broadcasts signals. Then, the transmitter can use the harvested energy to transmit data
to the gateway when the RF energy source becomes idle. This transmission scheme is also known as the
harvest-then-transmit protocol that is well known in the literature [17].
A. Smart and Reactive Jammer with Self-Interference Suppression Capability
We consider a2 smart and reactive jammer with self-interference suppression (SiS) capability. With the
latest advances in SiS [7], the jammer can “listen” to the channel while jamming. That allows the jammer
to instantaneously discern its jamming outcome and reactively optimize its jamming strategy to maximize
the disruption of the victims. The SINR at the gateway is formally calculated as follows [1], [13]:
θ =
PR
φP J + ρ2
, (1)
where PR is the received power from the transmitter at the gateway, P J is the jamming power transmitted
by the jammer, ρ2 is the variance of additive white Gaussian noise, and φP J expresses the jamming power
received at the gateway in which 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 is an attenuation factor.
In practice, the jammer can adjust its pulse duty cycle factor to achieve the maximum degradation on
the target channel while maintaining a time-average power constraint Pavg. Note that the average power
Pavg should be less than the peak jamming power Pmax, i.e., Pavg ≤ Pmax [13]. Specifically, let PJ =
{P J0 , . . . , P Jn , . . . , P JN} denote the vector of discrete jamming power levels. In each time slot, the jammer
can select any transmit power level P Jn as long as its the average power constraint is satisfied. If we denote
x , (x0, . . . , xn, . . . , xN) as a probability vector, then the strategy space of the jammer, denoted by Js, can
be defined as follows:
Js ,
{
(x0, . . . , xn, . . . , xN),
N∑
n=0
xn = 1, xn ∈ [0, 1],∀n ∈ {0, . . . , N},xP>J ≤ Pavg
}
. (2)
To find the defense policy in the worst case, as mentioned above, we consider a smart jammer that would
know the information of the transmitter, e.g., how many packets the transmitter can transmit/backscatter
and how many packets it can bring down if the jamming is successful (thanks to the SiS capability). In
such a case, based on this information and its given average power constraint Pavg, the jammer will find
an optimal strategy to attack the channel in order to maximize the disruption. In particular, we assume that
the jammer receives a reward wJn if it attacks the channel with power level P
J
n . w
J
n can be referred as the
number of packets that have been completely corrupted (i.e., not being successfully received/decoded, hence
not ACKed by the receiver) if the jamming power is P Jn . Let wJ = {wJ0, . . . , wJn, . . . , wJN} denote the reward
vector of the jammer. Thus, the objective function of the jammer can be defined as follows:
max
x
xw>J ,
s.t.

∑N
n=0 xn = 1,
xn ∈ [0, 1],∀n ∈ {0, . . . , N},
xP>J ≤ Pavg.
(3)
Note that the ambient RF signal is an external source that is out of control of the jammer and the transmitter
and also not impacted by neither the jammer or the node. Additionally, in this paper, we consider the case
2Note that our system model can be extended straightforwardly to the case with multiple jammers who perform attacks to the channel
cooperatively, i.e., only one jammer attacks the channel at a time.
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Fig. 2: Function and circuit diagram of the proposed anti-jamming system
in which the transmitter operates as a secondary user that only actively transmits data when the ambient
RF source is inactive. As such, Eq. (1) does not need to account for the ambient RF signals. Note that our
analysis is also applicable for general cases in which both the ambient RF source and the transmitter are
licensed devices operating on different licensed frequencies.
B. Ambient Backscattering-Augmented Communications
To defeat the above smart and reactive jamming attack, we propose a novel communications scheme,
namely “ambient backscatter-augmented communications”. Our high-level circuit architecture is shown in
Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2(a), we show the proposed circuit diagram that allows the transmitter to be able to harvest
energy, perform active RF transmission, and backscatter information. The circuit design for the integration
of energy harvesting and backscattering communication has also been considered in several research works
in the literature such as [16] and [18]. The architecture of transmitter consists of an antenna, a controller,
an energy harvester, an RF transmitter for active transmissions, an energy storage, a data buffer, and a load
modulator together with a backscatter decoder for ambient backscatter communications. The controller takes
responsibilities to make decisions, e.g., stay idle, transmit data, backscatter data, and harvest energy, for the
transmitter. When the ambient RF source is active and/or the jammer attacks the channel, if the transmitter
chooses to harvest energy, it will use the energy harvester to harvest energy from the ambient signal or the
jamming signal. The harvested energy is then stored in the energy storage and used when the transmitter
decides to actively transmit data to the gateway. In contrast, if the transmitter chooses to backscatter to
immediately transmit data to the gateway, the transmitter will modulate and reflect the ambient RF signal
or the jamming signal by using the load modulator [16]. In particular, the load modulator consists of an
RF switch, e.g., ADG902, directly connected to the antenna. The input of the load modulator is a stream
of one and zero bits which is generated by the controller depending on the application. When the input
bit is zero, the load modulator switches to load Z1, and thus the transmitter is in the non-reflecting state.
Otherwise, when the input bit is one, the load modulator turns to load Z2, and thus the transmitter is in the
reflecting state. By doing so, the transmitter can backscatter its data to the gateway. It is worth noting that
while operating in the backscatter mode, the transmitter still can harvest energy (in the non-reflecting state),
but the amount of the harvested energy is relatively small and only suitable for operations in the backscatter
mode [16], [17].
To allow the gateway to decode backscattered signals, the transmitter backscatters information at a lower
rate than the ambient signal, i.e., jamming signal and ambient signal. For completeness, we formally describe
the principle as follows. Assuming that we have a digital receiver that samples the received signal at the
Nyquist-information rate, e.g., using ADC [16]. The received signal at the gateway is sampled to y[n] as:
y[n] = x[n] + ζB[n]x[n] + l[n], (4)
where x[n]s are the samples of the ambient signal (i.e., the jamming signal, the ambient RF signal, or both
of them) received at the gateway, l[n] is the noise, ζ is the complex attenuation of the backscattered signal,
and B[n]s are the bits transmitted by the transmitter (through the load modulator). If the transmitter sends
information at a fraction of the rate, say 1
N
, then B[Ni + j] are all equal for j = 1 to N [16]. Then, the
gateway averages powers of N received samples as follows:
1
N
N∑
i=1
|y[n]|2 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
|x[n] + ζBx[n] + w[n]|2, (5)
where B takes a value of ‘0’ or ‘1’ depending on the non-reflecting and reflecting states, respectively. As
x[n] is uncorrelated with the noise w[n], (5) can be expressed as follows:
1
N
N∑
i=1
|y[n]|2 = |1 + ζB|
2
N
N∑
i=1
|x[n]|2 + 1
N
N∑
i=1
w[n]2. (6)
Denote P = 1
N
∑N
i=1 |x[n]|2 as the average power of the received jamming signal (or ambient signal).
Ignoring the noise, the average power at the receiver is |1 + ζ|2P and P when the backscatter transmitter is
at the reflecting (B = 1) state and the non-reflecting (B = 0) state, respectively. Based on the differences
between |1 + ζ|2P and P , the backscatter receiver can decode the data from the backscattered signal with
a conventional digital receiver [16].
However, the ADC consumes a significantly amount of power to sample the received signal. For a low-
power design, in Fig. 2(b), we describe a circuit diagram using only analog components to decode the
backscattered signal. In particular, the gateway is equipped with an antenna to receive information (either
active transmission or backscatter information) from the transmitter. Based on the received signal, the gateway
will decide to use a suitable mode to decode information from the transmitter. In particular, the active RF
decoder is used to decode active transmission signal from the transmitter. If the transmitter transmits data by
using the backscatter mode, the gateway will use the backscatter decoder to extract the information from the
backscattered signal. Specifically, at the backscatter decoder, the backscattered signal is first smoothed by
the envelope-averaging circuit. After that, the compute-threshold circuit produces an output voltage between
low and high levels of the smoothed signal. Then, the comparator compares the signal with a predefined
threshold to derive output bits zero and one properly. The more detailed information about hardware designs
as well as decoding algorithms at the receiver can be found in [16].
Note that although we consider a single transmitter in this paper, the proposed model and analysis can be
extended to the case with multiple transmitters. In such a case, one can adopt popular scheduling mechanisms,
e.g., TDMA, to avoid the collision between transmitters. Another approach is that transmitters backscatter
data at different rates [16], [17]. In this way, the gateway can decode the information in the backscattered
signal by leveraging the difference in communication rates.
C. System Operation
We denote the probability of the ambient RF source being idle in each time slot by η. Due to the constraints
on average power Pavg and maximum transmit power Pmax, the jammer may attack the channel with different
power levels at different time. When the jammer attacks the channel and the ambient RF source is idle,
the transmitter can choose one of the following actions (i) go to sleep mode, i.e., stay idle, (ii) harvest
energy from the jamming signal, (iii) backscatter information based on the jamming signal, or (iv) adapt its
transmission rate by using rate adaption (RA) techniques [1], [13]. Depending on the transmit power level P Jn
of the jammer, the transmitter can harvest eJn units of energy and backscatter maximum d̂
J
n packets through
the jamming signal. In practice, the more power the jammer uses to attack the channel, the more energy the
transmitter can successfully harvest from the jamming signal 3. In addition, through many real experiments
and analysis on backscatter communication systems in the literature [16], [18], [19], it can be observed that
the more power the jammer uses to attack the channel, the more energy per information bit the transmitter
can backscatter to the gateway, and thus the less Bit Error Rate (BER) of backscatter communication is. This
also implies that the more packets the transmitter can successfully transmit to the gateway by backscattering
the jamming signal when the jammer uses higher power levels to attack. We denote e = {eJ0, . . . , eJn, . . . , eJN}
as the amount of energy that the transmitter can successfully harvest from the jamming signal when the
jammer attacks the channel with power level PJ = {P J0 , . . . , P Jn , . . . , P JN}, respectively. Similarly we denote
d̂ = {d̂J0, . . . , d̂Jn, . . . , d̂JN} as the number of packets that the transmitter can successfully transmit to the
gateway when the jammer attacks the channel with power level PJ = {P J0 , . . . , P Jn , . . . , P JN}, respectively.
In practice, when the jammer attacks the channel and the ambient RF source does not transmit data, the
transmitter still can transmit its data by reducing its data rate. Specifically, based on jamming power P Jn ,
the transmitter can actively transmit data at maximum rate rm. We then denote r = {r1, . . . , rm, . . . , rM}
as the set of available transmission rates that the transmitter can choose to transmit data when the jammer
attacks the channel. At each rate rm, the transmitter can transmit maximum d̂rm packets. Note that, for
m = 1, . . . ,M , when γm−1 ≤ θ < γm with γm is the value of SINR, the gateway only can decode packets
3Based on the Friis equation [15], we also can obverse the proportional relationship between the amount of harvested energy and the
transmission power of energy source, i.e., the jammer.
sent at rates r0, r1, . . . , rm−1, and the packets sent at rate rm or higher will be completely lost [1]. To detect
the states of the ambient RF source and the jammer, several detection techniques can be adopted, e.g.,
energy detection [44], [45]. Note that there are miss detection and false alarm probabilities when detecting
the states of channels. However, our proposed algorithm can learn these probabilities and dynamically adjust
its optimal policy.
In this work, we define the packet delivery ratio (PDR) as the ratio of packets that are successfully
delivered to the gateway over the total number of packets arriving at the system. The arrival data process
follows the Poisson distribution with mean rate λ. The maximum data queue size and energy storage capacity
are denoted by D and E, respectively. If a packet arrives at the system when the data queue is full, it will
be dropped. To consider a low-latency system, if a packet stays in the queue longer than a latency threshold,
i.e., tth, it will be discarded.
If at least one of the sources (i.e., either the ambient RF source, or the jammer, or both of them) is active,
the transmitter can choose to backscatter data or harvest energy. The transmitter then observes the results of
the taken action, i.e., the total number of packet backscattered or the total amount of harvested energy, and
update the learning function. Based on the states of the ambient RF source and the jammer, the operations
of our system can be expressed as follows:
• When the ambient RF source is idle and the jammer does not attack the channel: the transmitter can
(i) transmit maximum d̂t packets if it has enough energy (each packet requires et units of energy to be
successfully transmitted) or (ii) stay idle.
• When the ambient RF source is idle and the jammer attacks the channel with power level P Jn : the
transmitter can (i) use the RA technique to transmit maximum d̂rm packets if it has enough energy, (ii)
backscatter maximum d̂Jn packets, (iii) harvest e
J
n units of energy, or (iv) stay idle.
• When the ambient RF source is active and the jammer does not attack the channel: the transmitter can
choose to (i) backscatter maximum d̂b packets, (ii) harvest eh units of energy, or (iii) stay idle.
• When the ambient RF source is active and the jammer attacks the channel with the power level P Jn :
the transmitter can choose to (i) backscatter dsum packets with dmin ≤ dsum ≤ dmax where dmin =
min(d̂b, d̂
J
n) and dmax = d̂b + d̂
J
n
4, (ii) harvest esum units of energy with emin ≤ esum ≤ emax where
emin = max(eh, e
J
n) and emax = eh + e
J
n [32]
5, or (iii) stay idle.
In this paper, time is slotted. In each time slot, given a particular channel condition and states of the ambient
RF source and the jammer, the amount of harvested energy and the number of backscattered/transmitted
packets, i.e., d̂t, d̂rm, d̂
J
n, e
J
n, d̂b, eh, dsum, esum, can be observed after interacting with the environment. Our
proposed deep dueling algorithm does not require this explicit information in advance. Instead, the algorithm
4The backscatter rate when both sources are active, dsum, should be in between the minimum of the backscatter rates of individual sources
and the summation of them. In general, we assume that dsum is unknown and captured by a random variable with a given distribution in the
above range.
5The harvested energy when both sources are active, esum, should be in between the maximum of the energy harvested from each individual
source and the summation of them. In general, we assume that esum is unknown and captured by a random variable with a given distribution
in the above range.
learn these values and converge to the optimal policy for the transmitter.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To deal with the uncertainty of jamming attacks and ambient RF signal, we adopt the Markov decision
process (MDP) framework to formulate the optimization problem of the system. This framework allows the
transmitter to dynamically make optimal actions based on its observations to maximize its average long-term
reward. The MDP is defined by a tuple < S,A, r > where S is the state space, A is the action space, and
r is the immediate reward of the system.
A. State Space
We define the state space of the system as follows:
S ,
{
(c, j, d, e) : c ∈ {0, 1}; j ∈ {0, 1}; d ∈ {0, . . . , D}; e ∈ {0, . . . , E}
}
, (7)
where c represents the state of the ambient RF channel, i.e., c = 1 when the ambient RF channel is busy
and c = 0 otherwise. j represents the state of the jammer, i.e., j = 1 when the jammer is active and j = 0
otherwise. d and e represent the number of packets in the data queue and the energy units in the energy
storage of the transmitter, respectively. D and E are the maximum data queue size and energy storage
capacity, respectively. The system state is then defined as a composite variable s = (c, j, d, e) ∈ S.
B. Action Space
The transmitter can perform one of the (M + 4) actions, i.e., stay idle, actively transmit data, harvest
energy from the ambient signals, backscatter data from the ambient signals, harvest energy from the jamming
signals, backscatter data from the jamming signals, or actively transmit data when then channel is attacked
with one of M transmission rates by using the RA technique. Then, the action space of the transmitter can
be defined by A , {a : a ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 4}}, where
a =

1, the transmitter stays idle,
2, the transmitter transmits data,
3, the transmitter harvests energy,
4, the transmitter backscatters data,
4 +m, the transmitter adapts its transmission to rate rm with m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
(8)
C. Immediate Reward
We define the reward for the system as the number of packets that are successfully transmitted to the
gateway. Thus, the immediate reward of the system after the transmitter makes an action a at state s can be
defined as follows:
r(s, a) =

dt, if c = 0, j = 0, d > 0, e ≥ et, and a = 2,
db, if c = 1, j = 0, d > 0, and a = 4,
dJn, if j = 1, c = 0, d > 0, and a = 4,
dsum, if j = 1, c = 1, d > 0, and a = 4
drm, if c = 0, j = 1, d > 0, e > 0, and a = 4 +m,
0, otherwise.
(9)
In the above, when the ambient RF source is idle, the jammer does not attack the channel, and the
number of data and energy units are sufficient for active transmission, the transmitter can actively transmit
0 < dt ≤ d̂t packets to the gateway (i.e, a = 2). When the ambient RF source is active, the jammer
is idle, and the transmitter has data to transmit, it can choose to backscatter 0 < db ≤ d̂b packets(i.e.,
a = 4). Similarly, when the jammer attacks the channel, the RF source is idle, and the transmitter has
data to transmit, if it choose to backscatter, it can transmit maximum 0 < dJn ≤ d̂Jn packets(i.e., a = 4). If
the ambient RF source is idle, the jammer attacks the channel, and the transmitter has enough energy and
data in the queues, it can choose to adapt its rate (i.e., a = 4 + m;m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}) and actively transmit
0 < drm ≤ d̂rm packets to the gateway. If both the jammer and the RF source are active, and the transmitter
has data to transmit, if it choose to backscatter data, it can transmit dmin ≤ dsum ≤ dmax to the gate way [32].
Finally, the immediate reward is equal to 0 if the transmitter cannot successfully transmit any packet to the
gateway.
Note that after performing an action, the transmitter will observe the results from the environment including
reward, i.e., number of packets that are successfully transmitted based on ACK messages sent from the
gateway. In other words, dt, db, dJn, dsum, and d
r
m are the actually received packet at the gateway, i.e.,
successfully-ACKed packets. For that, the reward function captures the overall path between the source and
the tag-receiver, e.g., fading, end-to-end SNR, BER, or the packet error rate.
D. Optimization Formulation
We formulate an optimization problem to obtain the optimal policy, denoted by pi∗, that maximizes the
average long-term reward for the system. Specifically, the optimal policy is a mapping from a state to an
action taken by the transmitter. In other words, given the current system state, i.e., data queue, energy level,
and channel states, the policy determines an optimal action to maximize the average long-term reward for
the system. The optimization problem is then expressed as follows:
max
pi
R(pi) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
E (rk(sk, pi(sk))) , (10)
where R(pi) is the average reward of the transmitter under the policy pi and rk(sk, pi(sk)) is the immediate
reward under policy pi at time step k. Clearly, the state space S contains only one communicating class, i.e.,
from a given state the process can go to any other states after k steps. In other words, the MDP with states
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in S is irreducible. Thus, for every pi, the average throughput R(pi) is well defined and does not depend on
the initial state [20].
IV. LEARNING ABOUT JAMMER AND ITS STRATEGIES WITH REINFORCEMENT LEARNING APPROACHES
A. Q-Learning Approach
In the system under consideration, the transmitter cannot obtain the information about the jammer, e.g.,
jamming capacity, as well as the ambient RF signal, e.g., channel operation frequency, in advance to find
the optimal policy. Thus, this section introduces Q-learning [21], a reinforcement learning algorithm, which
can help the transmitter find the optimal policy without requiring prior information about the jammer as
well as the channel. In particular, as illustrated in Fig. 3, the Q-learning algorithm implements a Q-table to
store state-action pair values. Given a current state, the algorithm will select an action based on its current
strategy. After performing the selected action, the Q-learning algorithm observes the immediate reward and
next state, and updates the Q-values based on the Q-value function. In this way, the Q-learning algorithm
can learn from its decisions, and it was proved that the Q-learning algorithm will converge to the optimal
policy after a finite number of iterations [21].
In this paper, we aim to find the optimal policy pi∗ : S → A, i.e., a mapping from states to their
corresponding actions, for the transmitter to optimize its performance, i.e., maximize its long-term average
throughput and minimize its packet loss, under the jamming attacks. Let’s denote Vpi(s) : S → R as the
expected value function obtained by policy pi from a state s ∈ S, that can be defined as follows:
Vpi(s) = Epi
[ ∞∑
t=0
γrt(st, at)|s0 = s
]
= Epi
[
rt(st, at) + γVpi(st+1)|s0 = s
]
, (11)
where 0 ≤ γ < 1 is the discount factor which represents the importance of long-term reward [21].
Specifically, if γ is close to 0, the algorithm is likely to select actions to maximize its short-term reward. In
contrast, when γ is close to 1, the algorithm will make actions such that its long-term reward is maximized.
rt(st, at) is the immediate reward achieved after performing action at at state st. To find the optimal policy
pi∗, at each state, an optimal action has to be found through the following optimal value function.
V∗(s) = max
a
{
Epi[rt(st, at) + γVpi(st+1)]
}
, ∀s ∈ S. (12)
For all state-action pairs, the optimal Q-functions are denoted by:
Q∗(s, a) , rt(st, at) + γEpi[Vpi(st+1)], ∀s ∈ S. (13)
Then, the optimal value function V∗(s) can be written as V∗(s) = maxa{Q∗(s, a)}. By making samples
iteratively, the problem is reduced to determining the optimal value of Q-function, i.e., Q∗(s, a), for all
state-action pairs. In particular, the Q-function is updated according to (14).
Qt+1(st, at) = Qt(st, at) + τt
[
rt(st, at) + γmax
at+1
Qt(st+1, at+1)−Qt(st, at)
]
. (14)
In particular, (14) is used to find the temporal difference between the predicted Q-value, i.e., rt(st, at) +
γmaxat+1 Qt(st+1, at+1) and its current value, i.e., Qt(st, at). The learning rate τt determines the impact
of new information to the existing value. During the learning process, the learning rate can be adjusted
dynamically, or it can be chosen to be a constant. However, to guarantee the convergence for the Q-learning
algorithm, the learning rate τt is deterministic, nonnegative, and satisfies the following conditions [21]:
τt ∈ [0, 1),
∞∑
t=1
τt =∞, and
∞∑
t=1
(τt)
2 <∞. (15)
Algorithm 1 Optimal Defense Strategy with Q-learning Algorithm
1: Inputs: For each state-action pair (s, a), initialize the table entry Q(s, a) arbitrarily, e.g., to zero. Observe
the current state s, initialize a value for the learning rate τ and the discount factor γ.
2: for t=1 to T do
3: From the current state-action pair (st, at), execute action at and obtain the immediate reward rt
4: and new state st+1. Select an action at+1 based on the state st+1 and then update the table entry
5: for Q(st, at) as follows:
Qt+1(st, at) = Qt(st, at) + τt
[
rt(st, at) + γmax
at+1
Qt(st+1, at+1)−Qt(st, at)
]
. (16)
6: Replace st ← st+1.
7: end for
8: Outputs: pi∗(s) = arg maxaQ∗(s, a).
The details of the Q-learning algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. Specifically, from the current state st,
the algorithm will choose an action at and observe results after performing this action. In practice, to select
action at, -greedy algorithm [22] is often adopted. In particular, this technique chooses a random action with
probability , and selects an action that maximizes the Q(s, as) with probability 1− . After performing the
chosen action, the Q-learning algorithm observes the next state and reward, and then updates the table entry
for Q(st, at) based on Eq. (14). When all Q-values converge or a certain number of iterations is reached,
the learning process will be terminated. The Q-learning algorithm yields the optimal policy indicating an
action to be taken at each state such that Q∗(s, a) is maximized for all states in the state space, i.e.,
pi∗(s) = arg maxaQ∗(s, a). Under the conditions of τt stated in Eq. (15), in Theorem 1, we show that the
Q-learning algorithm will converge to the optimum action-values with probability one.
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THEOREM 1. Under the conditions of τt in Eq. (15), the Q-learning algorithm converges to the optimum
action-values with probability one.
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A. It is worth noting that the Q-learning algorithm
can converge to the optimal policy in a reasonable time when the state space and the action space are
small. Nonetheless, for a complicated system with thousands of state-action pairs, the convergence rate of
the Q-learning algorithm is usually slow. That makes the Q-learning algorithm practically inapplicable [23],
especially for our considered system model which needs to learn activities from both the jammer and ambient
RF source. Thus, in the following, we introduce deep Q-learning and deep dueling algorithms to quickly
obtain the optimal defend policy for the transmitter, thereby effectively defeating the jamming attacks and
optimizing performance for the system.
B. Deep Q-Learning based Adaptation
In this section, we propose the deep Q-learning algorithm [24] to cope with the low-convergence problem
of the Q-learning algorithm introduced in Section IV. Intuitively, the deep Q-learning algorithm was intro-
duced by Google DeepMind in 2015 [24] to teach machines to play games without human intervention. The
deep Q-learning algorithm implements a deep neural network instead of the Q-table to find the approximated
values of Q∗(s, a) as illustrated in Fig. 4.
According to [24], the performance of reinforcement learning approaches might not be stable or even
diverges when using a nonlinear function approximator. The reason is that with a small change of Q-values,
the data distribution and correlations between the Q-values and the target values, i.e., r + γmaxaQ(s, a),
are varied, and thus the policy is greatly affected. To address this issue, we use three mechanisms, i.e.,
experience replay, target Q-network, and feature set.
• Experience replay mechanism: The algorithm implements a replay memory D, i.e., memory pool, to
store transitions (st, at, rt, st+1) instead of running on state-action pairs as they occur during experience.
Random samples from the memory pool are then fed to the deep neural network for training. In this way,
the algorithm can efficiently learn from previous experiences many times and remove the correlations
between observations [24].
• Target Q-network: Obviously, the Q-values will be changed during the training process. As a result,
the value estimations can be out of control if a constantly shifting set of values is used to update the
Q-network resulting in the destabilization of the algorithm. To overcome this issue, the deep Q-learning
algorithm implements a target Q-network to frequently but slowly update to the primary Q-network. As
such, the correlations between the target and estimated Q-values are significantly eliminated, thereby
stabilizing the algorithm.
• Feature set: For each state, we determine four features including the activities of the jammer and the
ambient RF source, i.e., active or idle, as well as the status of data and energy queues of the transmitter.
These features are then fed to the deep neural network to approximate Q-values for each state-action
pair. Doing so, all aspects of each state are trained resulting in a high convergence rate.
Algorithm 2 Deep Q-learning Based Anti-jamming Algorithm
1: Initialize replay memory D to capacity D.
2: Initialize the Q-network Q with random weights θ.
3: Initialize the target Q-network Qˆ with weight θ− = θ.
4: for episode=1 to I do
5: With probability  select a random action at, otherwise select at = arg maxQ∗(st, at; θ)
6: Perform action at and observe reward rt and next state st+1
7: Store transition (st, at, rt, st+1) in the replay memory D
8: Sample random mini-batch of transitions (sj, aj, rj, sj+1) from D
9: yj = rj + γmaxaj+1 Qˆ(sj+1, aj+1; θ−)
10: Perform a gradient descent step on (yj −Q(sj, aj; θ))2 with respect to the network parameter θ.
11: Every C steps reset Qˆ = Q
12: end for
Algorithm 2 provides the details of the deep Q-learning algorithm. In particular, as shown in Fig. 5, the
training phase consists of multiple episodes. In each episode, given the current state, the algorithm chooses
an action based on the epsilon greedy algorithm. The algorithm will start with a fairly randomized policy
and later slowly move to a deterministic policy. In other words, at the first episode,  is set at a large value,
e.g., 0.9, and gradually decayed to a small value, e.g., 0.1. After that, the algorithm performs the selected
action and observes results from taking this action, i.e., next state and reward. This transition is then stored
in the replay memory for training process at later episodes.
In the learning process, random samples of transitions from the replay memory will be fed into the neural
network. The algorithm then updates the neural network by minimizing the following lost function.
Li(θi) = E(s,a,r,s′)∼U(D)
[(
r + γmax
a′
Q(s′, a′; θ−i )−Q(s, a; θi)
)2]
, (17)
where γ is the discount factor, θi are the parameters of the Q-networks at episode i and θ−i are the parameters
of the target network, i.e., Qˆ. Differentiating the loss function in (17) with respect to the parameters of the
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neural networks, we have the following gradient:
∇θiL(θi) = E(s,a,r,s′)
[(
r + γmax
a′
Q(s′, a′; θ−i )−Q(s, a; θi)∇θiQ(s, a; θi)
)]
. (18)
To minimize the loss function in (17), one can use the Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm [25], which
is very important algorithm to power nearly all of deep learning algorithms, to calculate the gradient in (18).
In general, the cost function used by a machine learning algorithm is decayed by a sum over training
examples of some per-example loss function. For instance, the negative conditional log-likelihood of the
training data can be expressed as:
J(θ) = E(s,a,r,s′)∼U(D)L
(
(s, a, r, s′), θ
)
=
1
D
D∑
i=1
L
(
(s, a, r, s′)(i), θ
)
, (19)
where D is the size of the memory pool. For these additive cost function, gradient descent requires computing
as follows:
∇θJ(θ) = 1D
D∑
i=1
∇θL
(
(s, a, r, s′)(i), θ
)
. (20)
The computational cost for the operation in Eq. (20) is O(D). Thus, as the size D of the replay memory
is increased, the time to take a single gradient step becomes prohibitively long. As a result, in this paper,
we adopt the stochastic gradient descent technique. The key idea of using stochastic gradient descent is that
the gradient is an expectation. Clearly, the expectation can be approximately estimated by using a small set
of samples. In particular, we can uniformly sample a mini-batch of experiences from the replay memory
D at each step of the algorithm. In general, the mini-batch size can be set to be relative small number of
experiences, e.g., from one to a few hundred. As such, the training time is significantly fast. The estimate
of the gradient under the stochastic gradient descent is then formulated as follows:
g =
1
N
∇θ
N∑
i=1
L
(
(s, a, r, s′)(i), θ
)
, (21)
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where N is the mini-batch size. The stochastic gradient descent algorithm then follows the estimated gradient
downhill as in Eq. (22).
θ ← θ − νg, (22)
where ν is the learning rate of the algorithm.
After every C steps, the algorithm updates the target network parameters θ−i with the Q-network parameters
θi. The target network parameters remain unchanged between individual updates. Fig. 5 shows the flowchart
of the deep Q-learning algorithm.
V. FIGHTING JAMMER WITH DEEP DUELING NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
A. Deep Dueling Neural Network Architecture
According to [26], the convergence rate of the deep Q-learning algorithm is still limited due to the
overestimation of optimizers, especially in systems with large action and state spaces as considered in this
work. Therefore, we propose deep dueling algorithm [26], which was also originally developed by Google
DeepMind in 2016, to further improve the system’s convergence speed. The key idea making the deep dueling
superior to conventional approaches is its novel neural network architecture. Clearly, in many states, it is
unnecessary to estimate the value of corresponding actions as the choice of these actions has no repercussion
on what happens [26]. For example, the rate adaptation actions only matter when the jammer attacks the
channels with low power levels. Hence, instead of estimating the action-value function, i.e., Q-function,
the algorithm divides the deep neural network into two sequences, i.e., streams, of fully connected layers
to separately estimate the values of states and advantages of actions6. The values and advantages are then
combined at the output layer as shown in Fig. 6. In this way, the deep dueling algorithm can achieve more
robust estimates of state value, and thus significantly improving its convergence rate as well as stability. It
is worth noting that the flowchart of the deep dueling algorithm is the same as in the deep Q-learning. The
main difference between the deep dueling algorithm and other conventional deep reinforcement learning
algorithms is the deep dueling neural network. In the following, we present details of separating the Q-value
into the value and the advantage functions.
6The value function represents how good it is for the system to be in a given state. The advantage function is used to measure the importance
of a certain action compared with others [26].
Recall that given a stochastic policy pi, the values of state-action pair (s, a) and state s are as follows:
Qpi(s, a) = E[rt|st = s, at = a, pi],
Vpi(s) = Ea∼pi(s)
[Qpi(s, a)]. (23)
The advantage function of actions can be expressed as:
Gpi(s, a) = Qpi(s, a)− Vpi(s). (24)
Specifically, the value function V corresponds to how good it is to be in a particular state s [26]. The state-
action pair, i.e., Q-function, calculate the value of performing action a in state s. The advantage function
decouples the state value from the Q-function to measure the importance of each action.
To estimate values of V and G functions, we use a dueling neural network in which one stream of fully-
connected layers outputs a scalar V(s; β) and the other stream estimates an |A|-dimensional vector G(s, a;α),
where α and β are the parameters of fully-connected layers. These two sequences are then combined at the
output layer to obtain the Q-function by Eq. (25).
Q(s, a;α, β) = V(s; β) + G(s, a;α). (25)
Note that Eq. (25) applies to all (s, a) instances. Thus, to express equation (25) in matrix form, one needs
to replicate the scalar, V(s; β), |A| times. Importantly, Q(s, a;α, β) is a parameterized estimate of the
true Q-function, and given Q, we cannot obtain V and G uniquely. In other words, adding a constant to
V(s; β) and subtracting the same constant from G(s, a;α) result in the same Q-value. Therefore, Eq. (25) is
unidentifiable resulting in poor performance. To address this problem, the combining module of the network
is implemented the following mapping:
Q(s, a;α, β) = V(s; β) + (G(s, a;α)−max
a∈A
G(s, a;α)). (26)
In this way, the advantage function estimator has zero advantage when choosing action. Intuitively, given
a∗ = arg maxa∈AQ(s, a;α, β) = arg maxa∈A G(s, a;α), we have Q(s, a∗;α, β) = V(s; β). Therefore, we
can convert (26) into a simple form by replacing the max operator with an average as follows:
Q(s, a;α, β) = V(s; β) + (G(s, a;α)− 1|A|∑
a
G(s, a;α)). (27)
Note that subtracting the mean in Eq. (27) solves the unidentifiable problem. However, it does not change
the relative rank of the advantage function values, and hence the Q values for actions at each state. Based on
Eq. (27) and the advantages of the deep reinforcement learning, we propose the deep dueling algorithm as
shown in Algorithm 3. It is worth noting that Eq. (27) is viewed and implemented as a part of the network
and not as a separated algorithmic step [26]. In addition, V(s; β) and G(s, a;α) are estimated automatically
without any extra supervision or modifications in the algorithm.
Algorithm 3 Deep Dueling Neural Network Based Anti-jamming Algorithm
1: Initialize replay memory D to capacity D.
2: Initialize the primary network Q including two fully-connected layers with random weights α and β.
3: Initialize the target network Qˆ as a copy of the primary Q-network with weights α− = α and β− = β.
4: for episode=1 to I do
5: Base on the -greedy algorithm, with probability  select a random action at at state st. Otherwise,
6: select at = arg maxQ∗(st, at;α, β)
7: Perform action at and observe reward rt and next state st+1
8: Store transition (st, at, rt, st+1) in the replay memory
9: Sample random mini-batch of transitions (sj, aj, rj, sj+1) from the replay memory
10: Combine the value function and advantage functions as follows:
Q(sj, aj;α, β) = V(sj; β) +
(G(sj, aj;α)− 1|A|∑
aj
G(sj, aj;α)
)
. (28)
11: yj = rj + γmaxaj+1 Qˆ(sj+1, aj+1;α−, β−)
12: Perform a gradient descent step on (yj −Q(sj, aj;α, β))2
13: Every C steps reset Qˆ = Q
14: end for
B. Complexity Analysis and Implementation
Deep reinforcement learning (and deep learning in general) is well known for solving complicated and
intractable problems with much higher performance compared to conventional methods. However, it typically
requires many CPU and GPU resources, especially for large-scale and complex problems which require more
hidden layers. To implement deep learning in resource-constrained IoT devices, several solutions have been
proposed in the literature [30]. In [31], the authors proposed a novel method, called network compression,
to convert a densely connected neural network into a sparsely connected network. In this way, the storage
and computation load can be reduced by a factor of 10. The authors show that the network compression
can allow deep learning algorithm to be implemented on commonly used IoT platforms from Qualcomm,
Intel, and NVidia. Other approaches to reducing computational load such as approximate computing and
deploy specialized accelerator hardware also make deep learning suitable to run on the transmitter [30].
Note that our proposed deep dueling algorithm only uses a simple deep neural network architecture with
only one hidden layer for each stream. Together with recent advances in network compression, approximate
computing, and accelerators, our proposed solution can be successfully implemented in common IoT devices.
Nevertheless, for ultra low-power transmitters, deep reinforcement learning might not be able to be
implemented. To solve this problem, we use a central controller running on the gateway which has sufficient
computing power to run the algorithm. Note that although the number of iterations is significant, this
is the iterations for running the deep-Q learning algorithm, not the physical/real interactions between
the transmitter and the gateway. As such, the computation and communication overhead are practically
manageable. Specifically, at each state, given the current optimal policy, the transmitter will take an action
and observe the results from the environment. It then stores this experience, i.e., (sj; aj; rj; sj+1), in a
memory pool. After a certain period, e.g., a day, the transmitter will send experiences in the memory pool to
the gateway. The gateway will use all these experiences to train the deep neural network, i.e., estimate the
Q-value for each state-action pair, to obtain the optimal policy. Then, the optimal policy is sent back to the
transmitter. This optimal policy is then stored at the transmitter to guide it in making real-time decisions.
The proposed solution is thus also applicable to low-latency applications.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Parameter Setting
In our system, the data queue of transmitter can store up to 20 packets with the packet size set at 300
bits [27]. The energy storage capacity is set to be 20 units. The fundamental energy unit is 60 µJ [28]. When
the ambient RF source/channel is active, the transmitter can either harvest two units of energy or backscatter
one packet to the gateway. When the channel is idle and the jammer does not attack the channel, if the
transmitter performs active transmission, it can successfully transmit 4 packets. Each transmitted packet
requires one unit of energy. The jammer has four transmit power levels, i.e., PJ = {0W, 7W, 15W, 21W},
with Pmax= 21W [29]. As explained in the Section II, as the jamming power increases, the transmitter can
successfully harvest more energy or transmit more packets by backscattering jamming signal, and thus we set
e = {0, 2, 3, 4} and d̂ = {0, 1, 2, 3}. In addition, when the jammer attacks the channel and the rate adaption
technique is implemented, the transmitter can transmit drm ={2, 1, 0} packets when the jammer attacks
under power levels P Jn={7W, 15W, 21W}, respectively. In the case both the jammer and the ambient RF
source are active, the total number of backscattered packets dsum and the total amount of harvested energy
esum follow the Poisson distribution with the means of (dmin + dmax)/2 and (emin + emax)/2, respectively.
The latency threshold tth is set at 3 time units. Unless otherwise stated, the idle channel probability is 0.5
and Pavg = 7W. Note that the reinforcement learning algorithms, i.e., Q-learning, deep Q-learning, and deep
dueling, do not require the information about jammer, e.g., jamming strategy, and the channel activity, i.e.,
the idle channel probability, in advance. These information can be learned through the real-time learning
process.
The architecture of the deep neural network significantly affects the performance of the deep reinforcement
learning algorithms, and thus it requires a thoughtful design. In particular, the complexity of the algorithms
increases when the number of hidden layers increases. Nevertheless, if the number of hidden layers is
small, the algorithms requires a long time to converge to the optimal policy. Similarly, if the size of hidden
layers, i.e., numbers of neutrons, and the mini-batch size N are large, the algorithms will need more time to
estimate the Q-function. For deep Q-learning algorithms, we adopt parameters based on the common settings
for designing neural networks [24], [26]. Specifically, for the deep Q-learning algorithm, two fully-connected
hidden layers are implemented together with input and output layers (as illustrated in Fig. 4). For the deep
dueling algorithm, the neural network is divided into two streams. Each stream consists of a hidden layer
connected to the input and output layers as illustrated in Fig. 6). The size of the hidden layers is 16. The
mini-batch size is set at 16. The maximum size of the experience replay buffer is 10,000, and the target
Q-network is updated every 1,000 iterations [24], [25]. All learning algorithms use the -greedy scheme
with the initial value of  set at 1 and its final value set at 0.1 [21].
To evaluate the proposed solutions, we compare their performance with two other schemes, i.e., HTT
and WTJ. For the HTT scheme, the transmitter only implements harvest-then-transmit protocol without
considering ambient backscatter communication technology. This scheme is to evaluate the impact of ambient
backscatter communications to the system performance. For the WTJ, the transmitter can implement both
harvest-then-transmit protocol and ambient backscatter communication technology only for the ambient RF
signal. This scheme evaluates the system performance without leveraging the jamming signal. It is important
to note that the optimal policies of both HTT and WTJ are also obtained by the deep dueling algorithm,
i.e., Algorithm 3, presented in Section V.
B. Simulation Results
a) Compare with Non-machine Learning Rate Adaptation Technique: First, we compare our proposed
solution with a non-machine learning technique, i.e., rate adaptation (RA). With RA technique, the transmitter
has a fixed defend policy as follows: (i) when the jammer attacks the channel, the transmitter adapts its
rate based on the power level of the jammer and (ii) otherwise, the transmitter harvests energy from the
ambient RF signal. As shown in Fig. 7, the average throughput achieved by our proposed solution is much
higher than that of the RA technique. The reason is that with RA technique, the transmitter transmits data
at a low rate when the jammer attacks the channel with high power levels. Moreover, as stated in [13],
with the RA technique, the jammer can force the transmitter to always operate at the lowest rate by merely
randomizing its power levels, provided that the average jamming power is above a given threshold. When
Pavg increases, i.e., the jammer has more opportunities to attack the channel with high power levels, the
throughput achieved by the RA technique is significantly decreased. Our proposed solution, in contrast, can
allow the transmitter to much more effectively adapt its defense strategy based on the environment condition
and the attack strategy of the jammer. This is possible by implicitly learning the strategy of the jammer
as well as unknown parameters that are often assumed to be available in the literature (e.g., the power
constraint of the jammer, the jamming strategy...). Additionally, with the ambient backscatter capability, the
transmitter can always transmit its data to the gateway by leveraging the strong jamming signal.
b) Performance Evaluation: Next, we perform simulations to evaluate and compare the performance
of proposed solutions with those of the HTT and WTJ schemes in terms of average throughput, packet
loss, delay, and PDR. For the HTT and WTJ schemes, we adopt the Deep Dueling algorithm (with 4× 104
iterations) to obtain the optimal policy for the transmitter. For the proposed solutions, we recruit both the
Deep Dueling (with 4× 104 iterations) and Q-learning algorithms (with 106 iterations).
In Fig. 8, we vary the idle channel probability of the ambient RF source η and observe the performance
of the system. Clearly, the throughput of the WTJ policy decreases when η increases as shown in Fig. 8(a).
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Fig. 7: Average throughputs of the proposed solution and the RA technique vs. Pavg.
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Fig. 8: (a) Average throughput (packets/time unit), (b) Packet loss (packets/time unit), (c) Average number
of packets in the data queue, (d) PDR, (e) Delay (time/units) vs. η.
This is stemmed from the fact that when the ambient RF source is likely to be idle, the WTJ has less
opportunities to harvest energy and backscatter data from the ambient signal. This also leads to the increase
of packet loss and number of packets in the data queue as shown in Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 8(c), respectively.
In contrast, as the idle channel probability increases, the average throughputs obtained by the HTT policy
and the proposed solution increase, and their packet loss and number of packets in the data queue will be
reduced. The reason is that the transmitter has more opportunities to harvest energy from the jamming signal
and use the harvested energy to actively transmit data when the channel is idle. Additionally, the proposed
solution can also backscatter data through both the jamming and ambient signals, thereby its throughput is
considerably higher than that of the HTT scheme. In Fig. 8(d), we observe the PDR of the system. Clearly,
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Fig. 9: (a) Average throughput (packets/time unit), (b) Packet loss (packets/time unit), (c) Average number
of packets in the data queue, (d) PDR, (e) Delay (time/units) vs. Pavg.
the proposed solution achieves the best PDR compared to the other schemes. It is worth noting that, the
Q-learning algorithm cannot obtain the optimal policy in the first 106 iterations, thereby the performance
derived by the Q-learning algorithm is much lower than that of the Deep Dueling algorithm.
In Fig. 9, we vary Pavg to evaluate the average throughput, packet loss, number of packets in the data
queue, and PDR of the system. Obviously, when Pavg increases from 1W to 3W, the throughput of the HTT
and WTJ policies increases. The reason is that the transmitter has more chances to harvest energy from the
strong jamming signal and uses the harvested energy to transmit data when the jammer and the ambient RF
source are idle. However, when Pavg is large (e.g., higher than 3W), i.e., the jammer is more likely to attack
the channel, the throughput of these policies decreases as the transmitter has less chance to actively transmit
data to the gateway. In contrast, the throughput achieved by the proposed solution increases. The reason
is that the proposed solution allows the transmitter to switch to the backscatter mode when the jammer is
likely to attack the channel. Consequently, the proposed solutions achieve the best performance in terms of
packet loss, number of packets in the queue, PDR, and delay as shown in Fig. 9(b), Fig. 9(c), Fig. 9(d),
and Fig. 9(e), respectively. Again, the performance of the Q-learning algorithm is not as good as the Deep
Dueling algorithm due to the slow-convergence problem.
Next, we vary the maximum number of packets d̂t that the transmitter can actively transmit to the gateway
and evaluate the performance of the proposed solution as shown in Fig. 10. As shown in Fig. 10(a), as d̂t
increases, the throughput of WTJ scheme also increases and remains the same when d̂t ≥ 6. This is due to
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Fig. 10: (a) Average throughput (packets/time unit), (b) Packet loss (packets/time unit), (c) Average number
of packets in the data queue, (d) PDR, (e) Delay (time/units) vs. d̂t.
the fact that the transmitter does not leverage the strong jamming signal (except when both the source are
active), and thus the amount of harvested energy is limited. In contrary, the HTT policy allows the transmitter
to harvest energy from both the ambient and jamming signal. As a result, its throughput increases and is
higher than that of the WTJ policy. Importantly, by balancing the time for backscattering data and harvesting
energy, the throughput achieved by the proposed solution is significantly higher than that of the HTT and
WTJ schemes. This also leads to the reductions of the packet loss and number of packets waiting in the
data queue as shown in Fig. 10(b) and Fig. 10(c), respectively. In Fig. 10, we observe the PDR of obtained
by the three schemes. Clearly, the proposed solution continues to achieve the best PDR compared to other
schemes.
In Fig. 11, we vary the packet arrival rate λ to evaluate the performance of the proposed solution. Clearly,
when λ increases to 2 packets/time slot, the throughputs of all three schemes are increased as the transmitter
can transmit more packets. However, when λ > 2 packets/time slot, the throughputs remain the same as
the transmitter obtains the optimal policy. Note that with energy harvesting and backscattering capabilities,
the proposed solution can achieve the highest throughput among three schemes. As the transmitter cannot
transmit all the arrival packets, the packet loss and the number of packets waiting in the data queue increase
when λ increases as shown in Fig. 11(b) and Fig. 11(c), respectively. With the total number of arrival packets
increases, the PDRs of all three schemes are reduced as shown in Fig. 11(d). It is worth noting that in all
cases the performance of the Q-learning algorithm is not as high as the Deep Dueling algorithm as it can
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Fig. 11: (a) Average throughput (packets/time unit), (b) Packet loss (packets/time unit), (c) Average number
of packets in the data queue, (d) PDR, (e) Delay (time/units) vs. λ.
not converge to the optimal policy within 106 iterations.
Finally, we vary the latency threshold and investigate the performance of the proposed solution as shown
in Fig. 12. Obviously, when the latency threshold increases from 1 to 4 time units, the throughputs and
the PDRs obtained by all schemes increase as shown in Fig. 12(a) and Fig. 12(d), respectively, and the
packet losses decreases as shown in Fig. 12(b). This is stemmed from the fact that with a very short period
of latency, more packets will be discarded from the data queue resulting in lower throughputs. When the
latency threshold is large, the throughputs remain the same as the deep dueling algorithm obtains the optimal
solution to effectively utilize the ambient signal as well as the jamming signal. As the latency threshold
increase, the arrival packets have more time to stay in the data queue. As such, the number of packets in
the data queue increases as shown in Fig. 12(c). Note that the Deep Dueling algorithm always achieves the
best performance in all cases. In contrast, the Q-learning algorithm cannot achieve the optimal policy for
the transmitter due to the slow-convergence problem.
c) Convergence of Deep Reinforcement Learning Approaches: We first show the learning process and
the convergence of the proposed deep reinforcement learning algorithms, i.e., deep Q-learning and deep
dueling, in several scenarios. As shown in Fig. 13(a) and Fig. 13(b), when the maximum sizes of data and
energy queues are set at 10 and 20, respectively, after 106 iteration, the average throughput obtained by the
Q-learning algorithm is much lower than those of the deep reinforcement learning algorithms, especially in
the first 105 iterations. This implies that as the system state space increases, the Q-learning algorithm requires
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Fig. 12: (a) Average throughput (packets/time unit), (b) Packet loss (packets/time unit), (c) Average number
of packets in the data queue, (d) PDR, (e) Delay (time/units) vs. tth.
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Fig. 13: Convergence rates when (a) D = E = 10 and (b) D = E = 20.
more time to be converged, and thus given a fixed short time period, the system performance obtained by
the Q-learning algorithm cannot achieve the results as great as those of deep reinforcement algorithms (i.e.,
Deep Q-learning and Deep Dueling algorithms). Note that in Fig. 13, the performance obtained by Deep-Q
learning algorithm is as close as that of Deep Dueling algorithm, however the average throughput obtained
by the Deep-Q learning algorithm is very fluctuated compared with that of the Deep Dueling algorithm.
This implies that the Deep-Q learning algorithm requires more time to be converged compared with that of
the Deep Dueling algorithm.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed the optimal anti-jamming framework which allows the wireless transceivers
to effectively defeat jamming attacks. In particular, with the ambient backscatter capability, while being
attacked, the device can either adapt its transmission rate or backscatter its data to the gateway through the
jamming signal or harvest energy from the jamming signal to support its operations. To effectively learn about
the jamming attacks as well as the channel activities, we have proposed an optimal anti-jamming strategy
based on MDP to obtain the optimal defend policy for the transmitter. Then, the reinforcement learning
algorithms, i.e., Q-learning, deep Q-learning, and deep dueling, have been developed to maximize the long-
term average throughput and minimize the packet loss. Extensive simulations have demonstrated that by
using two streams of fully-connected hidden layers, the proposed framework using deep dueling algorithm
can improve the average throughput up to 426% and reduce the packet loss by 24%. Importantly, with
ambient backscatter and energy harvesting technology, jamming signal can be leveraged by the transmitter
as the ambient RF signal, thereby effectively eliminating jamming attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first anti-jamming solution that allows wireless transceivers to not only survive jamming attacks
without requiring additional resources but also leverage the jamming signal to improve their transmission
rate. The proposed ambient backscattering augmented communications framework can be applicable to both
civil (e.g., ultra-reliable and low-latency communications or URLLC) and military scenarios (to combat both
inadvertent and deliberate jamming).
APPENDIX A
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Here, we prove that Q-learning converges to the optimum action-values with probability one, i.e.,Qt(s, a)→
Q∗(s, a) as n→∞. The main idea of the convergence proof is an artificial controlled Markov process called
the action-replay process (ARP) [21], which is formulated from the learning rate τt and the episode sequence.
In particular, the state space of the ARP is {〈s, t〉} together with a special absorbing state, where s is a
state of the real process and t ≥ 1 is the level of the ARP. The action space is {a} where a is an action
from the real process.
The stochastic reward and state transition consequence when action a is taken at state s are as follows:
i∗ =

argmaxi{ti ≤ t}, if (s, a) is perfomed
before episode t,
0, otherwise,
(29)
where i is the index of the ith time action a is taken at state s. In this way, ti∗ is the last time before episode
t where (s, a) is executed in the real process. When i∗ = 0, the reward is set as Q0(s, a), and the ARP
absorbs. Otherwise, let denote
ie =

i∗, with probability τti∗ ,
i∗ − 1, with probability (1− τti∗ )τti∗−1 ,
i∗ − 2, with probability (1− τti∗ )(1− τti∗−1)τti∗−2 ,
...
0, with probability
∏i∗
i=1(1− τti),
(30)
as the index of the episode that is replayed or taken. If ie = 0, as above, the reward is set at Q0(s, a), and
the ARP absorbs. In contrary, when ie#0, the reward is rtie , and a state transition is formed as 〈s′tie , tie−1〉.
As stated in [21], the ARP tends towards the real process. Thus, Qt(s, a) tends to Q∗(s, a), where
Qt(s, a) = Q∗ARP (〈s, t〉, a), ∀a, s, and t ≥ 0, is the optimal Q-value for the tth level of the ARP [21,
Lemma A]. Without loss of generality, we assume that Qt(s, a) < r∗(1−γ) , where r∗ ≥ |rt| is the bound of
the reward. Given χ > 0, choose ξ such that
γξ
r∗
1− γ <
χ
6
. (31)
Based on Lemmas B.2, B.3, B.4 in [21], we can compare the value Q¯ARP (〈s, t〉, a1, . . . , aξ) of taking
actions a1, . . . , aξ in the ARP with Q¯(s, a1, . . . , aξ) of taking them in the real process as follows:
|Q¯ARP (< s, t >, a1, . . . , aξ)− Q¯(s, a1, . . . , aξ)| <
χ(1− γ)
6ξr∗
2ξr∗
1− γ +
2χ
3ξ(ξ + 1)
ξ(ξ + 1)
2
=
2χ
3
.
(32)
Clearly, the effect of taking only ξ actions makes a difference of less than χ
6
for both the ARP and the real
processes. As Eq. (32) can be applied to any set of actions, it applies perforce to a set of actions optimal
for either the real process or the ARP. Thus, we have
|Q∗ARP (〈s, t〉, a)−Q∗(s, a)| < χ. (33)
As a result, with probability 1, Qt(s, a)→ Q∗(s, a) as n→∞.
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